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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0583  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000267

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [EWWT](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [AF](#) [PK](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING, JUNE 17,2009

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invitation to participate in Operation Active Endeavor,  
NATO's counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean.  
(Note: After sounding Russia out and getting a positive  
response, the Deputy Secretary sent Russia a formal  
invitation to participate in OAE. (ref B)) On the other  
hand, most Allies felt it was premature to discuss a  
potential Russian role in NATO's long-term counterpiracy  
mission.

-- EAPC SECURITY FORUM: The Deputy Secretary General said  
that confirmed participation for the upcoming Euro-Atlantic  
Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum in Astana was  
disappointing. He appealed for more significant Allied  
participation.

-- PLANNING FOR UPCOMING MEETINGS AND TRIPS: The UK said Allies should discuss potential meetings and trips which might be held after NATO's summer recess in August. In particular, he said Allies should follow up on the U.S. suggestion for the North Atlantic Council to travel to the Balkans. He also asked about the possibility of an ISAF-format meeting in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly.

END SUMMARY.

Afghanistan

12. (C/REL ISAF) AWACS: The Director of the International Military Staff (DIMS) LTG Godderij applauded the June 11 decision by Defense Ministers to deploy AWACS in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan. He said initial infrastructure shipments to the Forward Operating Base in Konya, Turkey, had already begun. Three aircraft and four crews would arrive over the coming weekend, enabling the first operational mission on June 23.

13. (C/REL ISAF) NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A): Godderij reported that SHAPE had received the order to begin implementation of NTM-A, pursuant to the June 11-12 Defense Ministers' decision. He highlighted an urgent need for police trainers and mentors to fall into existing force arrangements, asking nations to provide offers immediately. In the meantime, SHAPE was working with Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to determine manning, infrastructure, and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) requirements, as well as to clarify which existing CSTC-A assets in theatre would be utilized by NTM-A.

While the first formal report on NTM-A implementation was due at the October meeting of Defense Ministers, Godderij continued, SHAPE and the International Military Staff would provide regular status updates to the Council. UK PermRep Eldon and Ambassador Daalder pushed DIMS for establishing NTM-A's command and control structure by mid-July, aligned with SHAPE's broader work on overall ISAF command and control. The UK requested setting implementation dates and deadlines for NTM-A. The Deputy Secretary General said Assistant Secretary General for Operations Martin Howard would work to produce an update report on NTM-A implementation by mid-July.

14. (C/REL ISAF) ISAF Command and Control (C2): Godderij said

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SHAPE would provide urgent detailed C2 input. He emphasized that nations must be ready to accept the fiscal implications of a new C2 arrangement once a decision was made. Ambassador Daalder expressed the urgency achieving a Council decision on this issue before NATO's summer break in order to allow implementation to begin as quickly as possible after the upcoming Afghan presidential elections.

15. (C/REL ISAF) National contributions: France announced deployment of three Tiger and two Cougar helicopters to support elections security in Kabul Province and Regional Command-East. Norway released a paper describing its newly adopted strategy for Faryab province, addressing the future of their PRT and Norway's plan for gradual transfer of the PRT's responsibilities to Afghan government authorities.

KFOR

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16. (C) The UK asked when Allies might expect SACEUR's recommendation to transition KFOR to deterrent presence Gate I (10,000 troops), noting that once the recommendation was received Allies would need to begin the political processes that "everyone agrees is necessary." Lieutenant General Godderij said he was unsure of the timing. SHAPE planned to hold a conference in August to examine this issue with an aim

of achieving Gate I by January 2010.

¶17. (C) Rear Admiral Moreno, Deputy Assistant Director of the International Military Staff's Operations Division, briefed that the continuing 16.9 million euro shortfall in the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) Trust Fund could have a negative impact on the KSF's ability to meet initial and full operating capability (IOC/FOC). Greece asserted that KSF operational capabilities were tied to KFOR's ability to move to deterrent presence, adding that SHAPE should take this into account when making its deterrent presence recommendation. RADM Moreno confirmed that SHAPE would include this issue in its calculations on deterrent presence and that this would be reflected in its recommendations to the Council.

¶18. (C/REL KFOR) In a separate meeting with non-NATO KFOR troop contributors later in the day, Ambassador Daalder stressed NATO's--and Washington's--continuing commitment to Kosovo and the need for a political assessment before the Council authorizes KFOR movement to each gate of deterrent presence. Italy echoed similar points. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland endorsed deterrent presence, but also stressed the need for political decisions at each gate based on both political and security criteria. They also argued for a strategic communications campaign to signal NATO's continued engagement. All asked that non-NATO troop contributors be included in the decision-making process at each gate.

¶19. (C/REL KFOR) Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland indicated their continued desire to participate in KFOR. Finland said it would reduce its KFOR contingent but continue to serve as lead nation for Multinational Task Force-Central and reinforce its Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) unit. Switzerland expressed the intent to maintain its KFOR contribution and not reduce its contribution proportionally with overall reductions.

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Iraq  
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¶10. (C) NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations Martin Howard briefed on his June 13-14 trip to Baghdad to continue negotiations for a long-term legal agreement on the status of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). Howard said that when he arrived in Iraq with his team--which included the NATO Legal Advisor--the Iraqis provided him with new draft language on jurisdiction issues. Howard said that the his team had made some suggestions on the text, which were accepted by the GOI. According to Howard, the NATO Legal Advisor had studied the new text and believes that--with the IS changes incorporated--it "appears to grant status equivalent to the U.S. arrangement." As a result, Howard noted that the NATO Legal Advisor thought the proposed arrangement met the requirements set forth by the NAC and represented an acceptable basis for continuing NTM-I. Howard said that the NATO International Staff was submitting the jurisdiction text to Allies for agreement in principle. (Note: NATO's Policy Coordination Group did subsequently agree in principle to the jurisdiction text.) Howard said that an Iraqi team would travel to Brussels to finish negotiations on the complete document, which he hoped could be signed by July 8. Howard urged members not to take any action which might delay the approval of this agreement. Howard also cautioned that Iraq's Council of Ministers and/or Council of Representatives could still create additional hurdles which would have to be negotiated before the agreement was finalized. (Note: As Embassy Baghdad points out in ref A, despite the claims of "equivalency" there do seem to be some differences between the status provided to the U.S. in its bilateral agreement with Iraq and that being offered by Baghdad to NATO. It is unclear what practical impact these differences would have, however.)

¶11. (C) Following up on an earlier informal discussion by PermReps, the Deputy Secretary General asked for Allied agreement to take informal "soundings" to determine whether Russia would accept an invitation to contribute a ship to NATO's modest Article 5 counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). He further proposed that in the event of a positive response to the soundings, he would send the Russian Mission a formal invitation to contribute to OAE. In support of his proposal, the Deputy Secretary General noted that NATO had encouraged partner contributions to OAE. Allies agreed to this way ahead, but also agreed with Ambassador Daalder that the Alliance needed reasonable assurances that Moscow would say yes before a formal invitation was issued. (Note: After consultations with the Russian Mission, the Deputy Secretary General did send a formal invitation letter to Russian Ambassador Rogozin on June 18 (ref B), noting that such a contribution would underline the political signal of NATO-Russia reengagement to be sent at the June 27 NATO-Russia Council Foreign Ministerial in Corfu.)

¶12. (C) In response to questions raised by Ambassador Daalder, LTG Godderij told us separately that several NATO

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ships were currently assigned to OAE in a standby mode, but that they would also "surge" into a deployment at predetermined times. He said a Russian contribution could deploy so that it "surged" with the NATO vessels. (Note: Germany also said that it would have a ship participating in OAE, but it was not immediately clear whether that would only be on temporary basis while the ship transited the region.)

¶13. (C) Noting the Alliance's recent decision to move forward with a long-term NATO role in counterpiracy operations, Ambassador Daalder asked whether the Alliance should also explore a Russian contribution to that effort. While Allies were open to the possibility of moving in that direction over time, most believed that it was too early to begin concrete discussions with Moscow on the subject. The UK said that Allies would "need to think through" the impact on NATO's counterpiracy efforts, arguing that Allies should avoid getting into "institutional ping-pong" for the sake of being nice to the Russians. The UK added that it felt the NATO operation should yield NATO "added-value" and it wasn't clear a Russian contribution would do that. Canada agreed, noting that NATO needed to do more to "flesh out and discuss" its own role in counterpiracy. Canada also said that counterpiracy should not be considered a deliverable for the Corfu ministerial. Bulgaria simply said that NATO had "more homework" to do on this issue. Only Norway was reasonably forward leaning, suggesting that Russia could be sounded out on this topic at the same time it was sounded out about OAE.

EAPC Security Forum

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¶15. (C) The Deputy Secretary General reported that confirmed participation at the upcoming Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum in Kazakhstan was "disappointing." He appealed for more meaningful participation from Allied nations.

Upcoming Travel and Meetings

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16 (C) The UK asked for some "horizon scanning" regarding meetings and trips that might take place following the European August holidays. In particular, he said that Allies should follow up on the U.S. proposal for NAC trips to Montenegro and Bosnia. He also said that he wanted more clarity on the possibility of an ISAF-format meeting in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly.

